mostafa hosseini golkar; mohamad mohamad rezaii
Volume 10, Issue 39 , October 2014, , Pages 59-94
Abstract
Abstract
Regarding Wittgensteinian view towards fideism, two questions have been left unanswered: Firstly, has Wittgenstein explicitly defended fideism? And secondly, can fideism be deducted from his thoughts? In the present paper, after a research into the nature of fideism, it has been shown that ...
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Abstract
Regarding Wittgensteinian view towards fideism, two questions have been left unanswered: Firstly, has Wittgenstein explicitly defended fideism? And secondly, can fideism be deducted from his thoughts? In the present paper, after a research into the nature of fideism, it has been shown that relating fideism to Wittgenstein has mostly been based on a special interpretation of part of his Philosophical Investigations. Attention to and reflection in Wittgenstein’s collection of ideas, especially in Culture and Value and Lectures and Conversations shows numerous reasons and evidence exist which reject Wittgenstein’s fideism and can be substituted for the common existing hypothesis. Moreover, it should be remembered that inducing fideism from the distinction between language-game of religion and that of other entities is somehow the mixing of the language-game as meaning and understanding hypothesis and the induction and judgment hypothesis, and, eventually, following the path of religious thinking of Wittgenstein somehow challenges the view of dividing his realms of thought into two periods.
